We investigate the effects of risk aversion on optimal transmission and generation expansion planning in a competitive and complete market. To do so, we formulate a stochastic model that minimizes a weighted average of expected transmission and generation costs and their conditional value at risk (CVaR). We show that the solution of this optimization problem is equivalent to the solution of a perfectly competitive risk-averse Stackelberg equilibrium, in which a risk-averse transmission planner maximizes welfare after which risk-averse generators maximize profits. This model is then applied to a 240-bus representation of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, in which we examine the impact of risk aversion on levels and spatial patterns of generation and transmission investment. Although the impact of risk aversion remains small at an aggregate level, state-level impacts on generation and transmission investment can be significant, which emphasizes the importance of explicit consideration of risk aversion in planning models.
Introduction
Transmission planners in liberalized electricity markets face large amounts of uncertainty. This includes short-term uncertainty about demand, intermittent generation, and equipment outages, but more importantly, long-term fuel prices, load growth, construction cost, and policy uncertainty. The amount of both short-term and long-term uncertainty is likely to increase even further in the coming decade, with increasing amounts of renewable generation capacity, increasing uncertainty about the availability of fossil fuels, and worldwide proliferation of policies to stimulate renewable development. This has implications for investment, since investments in both transmission and generation capacity usually have very long lead times of multiple years or even decades, and decisions are not easily reversible (Fuss et al., 2008; Barradale, 2010; Hu and Hobbs, 2010) .
To allow transmission planners to make better decisions in this uncertain environment, stochastic planning models have been developed (see, e.g., De la Torre et al. 1999; Sauma and Oren 2006; Roh et al. 2009 ; van der Weijde and Hobbs 2012; Munoz et al. 2014 ). However, these models usually assume risk-neutral transmission planners, and that generation rms that invest in new capacity following transmission are, likewise, risk neutral. Most empirical evidence on investments suggests that decision makers, whether public or private, are instead risk averse. 1 Modeling of risk aversion might change near-term investments, for instance by increasing the attractiveness of delaying investments in order to gain more information, or by increasing the value of diverse portfolios of transmission investments that avoid the risk of poor performance under some future scenarios. Risk neutral stochastic transmission planning models may therefore a) be inappropriate if the transmission planner is risk averse and b) incorrectly model the response of risk averse generators to transmission investment.
Others have analyzed the impact of risk aversion, and therefore the eect of a simplifying risk-neutrality assumption, on transmission and generation planning problems; some of this literature is surveyed in Section 2 below. However, the vast majority of these studies only look at either generation or transmission investment, and fail to capture the important interactions between the two that have been identied in the earlier transmission-generation planning literature (e.g., Munoz et al., 2014; van der Weijde and Hobbs, 2012) . Moreover, they are generally based on very small models, which are not necessarily representative of large real-world transmission networks and cannot capture the full spatial patterns of transmission and generation investment.
This paper is a rst attempt to investigate the impact of risk aversion on the results of large-scale electricity planning models that represent the interactions between transmission and generation investment. We compare the transmission and generation expansion plans identied by such a model under assumptions of risk neutrality and risk aversion, to see where risk aversion makes a dierence, and consequently, whether the existing studies and models that assume risk 1 As discussed in , both the Midcontinent and the California Independent System Operators use engineering rules that aim at identifying robust" or least regret" transmission projects. Although risk aversion is not explicitly mentioned in these studies, their methodologies suggest that the planning authorities are more concerned with worst-case situations (i.e., risk averse preferences) than with the expected performance of the selected projects across all considered scenarios (i.e., risk neutrality).
2 neutrality are adequate or not.
We model a proactive risk-averse transmission planner, who maximizes a risk-adjusted measure for social welfare, and, because transmission expansion changes nodal electricity prices, anticipates a response by risk averse investors in generation capacity. As we will see, the solution to this Stackelberg equilibrium problem is, under some reasonable assumptions, equivalent to a risk-averse cost minimization, allowing us to solve the problem at scale for a 240-bus representation of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) network of North America.
Naturally, our approach has limitations: we only model a single decision stage, the complex interactions between individual generators and between generators and the transmission planner that occur in real-world imperfectly competitive markets are not fully captured, and we use a simple case study with a linearized DC representation of the electrical ows on the network. Nevertheless, our results do indicate that risk aversion can have impact on the amount of investment in transmission and generation capacity, on the type of capacity, and on the spatial distribution of that capacity.
The next section will review some of the existing literature on risk-averse generation and transmission planning. In Section 3 we describe our methodology and derive the equivalence of the risk-averse Stackelberg equilibrium problem and the risk-averse cost minimization. Section 4 summarizes the assumptions and approach of the WECC case study, the results of which follow in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
Existing literature
In this section we rst overview dierent methods to include risk aversion in planning models. We then briey review the existing literature on risk-averse generation and transmission planning.
Modeling risk aversion
There are several ways to include risk aversion in planning models. In the economics literature, concave utility functions are popular: these can be used to convert monetary costs (or prots) into utilities, whose expected value is then optimized instead of the original objective (Fishburn, 1970) . Possible specications for the utility functions include exponential functions (exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion, CARA) and isoelastic functions (exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, CRRA) (Eeckhoudt et al., 2005) . These functions are, of course, nonlinear, which makes including them in large-scale planning models challenging. If, in addition to investors being CARA risk averse, the distribution of possible outcomes is normal, the exponential utility function can be written as a linear combination of expected outcomes and the standard deviation of the outcome distribution, which is quadratic. This mean-variance utility approach simplies the problem signicantly, which is one of the reasons for its popularity, but it is, unfortunately, often used in settings where the assumption of 3 normality is clearly invalid (such as a stochastic planning problem with a small number of scenarios).
Another way to model risk aversion, which originates in the nancial mathematics literature, is to include the value at risk (VaR) (Due and Pan, 1997) or conditional value at risk (CVaR) (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000) in the decision maker's objective or constraints. VaR gives the probability that outcomes are worse than a given threshold; however, its mathematical properties are unattractive. CVaR gives the expected outcome over outcomes that are worse than the VaR. Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) demonstrate that, for a given quantile, the CVaR can be computed as part of the solution of a simple linear program, which makes its inclusion in large-scale planning models relatively straightforward.
Finally, robust planning models nd the minimum cost solution that is feasible under a range of potential realizations of uncertain variables (Mulvey et al., 1995; Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2002) . A wide range of dierent formulations has been proposed: some only include constraints that enforce feasibility in all scenarios without considering costs, whereas others are closer to CVaR-based models in that they minimize worst-case costs or maximize worst-case outcomes.
The advantage of this approach is that the probabilities of future scenarios do not have to be dened; however, without them, risk aversion is limited to the worst-case outcome and the expected performance of the solution cannot be evaluated.
All of these methods have been applied to transmission and generation planning; Sections 2.2 and 2.3 give an overview of some of these studies and their results, without aiming to be a comprehensive literature review.
Risk-averse generation planning
Several studies have used the above methods to consider the eect of risk aversion on investment in electricity generation capacity, usually in the setting of a perfectly competitive market. Using theoretical economic models, Neuho and de Vries (2004) show that if consumers and investors are risk averse, and these risks cannot be traded, competitive markets will not deliver enough investment because risk premia increase generator costs. Moreover, they skew the generation mix towards less risky, less-capital intensive technologies, which is also undesirable from a social perspective, and is a serious barrier to investment in renewables. Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011a,b) show similar eects using stochastic equilibrium models with CVaR-maximizing investors or stochastic discount rates. In their models, which feature uncertain fuel costs, emissions reduction targets, and numbers of carbon allowances, risk averse investors build more open cycle gas turbines and less coal-red generation capacity. This is because the latter have a higher up-front capital cost and are therefore more risky; however, they also show that there are important interactions between risk aversion and model constraints, such as price caps or carbon targets. Fan et al. (2010) , which has investors maximizing utility functions that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, shows that the way these carbon targets are implemented is highly relevant as well. If a carbon taxed or auctioned permit scheme is anticipated, risk averse generators prefer cleaner generation technologies to ensure against these regulatory costs. If, on the other hand, grandfathered permits are considered, this favors investment in carbon-intensive generation capacity.
These papers focus on project-based investment decisions, such that potential investment in each technology is evaluated separately. Roques et al. (2008) take a dierent approach and use mean-variance optimization to investigate how risk averse investors would choose a portfolio of technologies. They illustrate the importance of correlations between the uncertain variables in this context:
if, as is often the case, gas prices and electricity prices are highly correlated, this makes investment in gas-red generation capacity less risky (as high input price, which decreases prots, will usually coincide with a high electricity price, which compensates for the increase in input prices). Hence, risk averse investors favor gas-red generation capacity, rather than nuclear or coal-red. In their model, electricity prices are exogenous. A similar analysis is done in Huang and Wu (2008) for Taiwan, but focusing on minimizing the risk-weighted value of total generation cost. Meunier (2013) shows similar interactions between technologies in a portfolio-style model with endogenous prices. In this model, investment in peaking capacity may also increase with risk aversion, not because of exogenous correlations but because peaking capacity sets prices, which makes it useful to hedge against the the returns on investment in baseload capacity. The meanvariance approach has also been applied to wind planning. For instance, Roques et al. (2010) use this approach to nd a portfolio of cross-country portfolios that minimize the total variance of wind production in Europe. They conclude that additional cross-country transmission capacity and more coordinated renewable energy policies in Europe could signicantly increase the eciency of the wind portfolio. For a general framework on uncertainty and risk analysis in power system planning, we refer to Merrill and Wood (1991) .
Most of the models developed in the papers mentioned above are small, with a limited number of scenarios, time periods, and generation technologies. An exception is Jin et al. (2011) , which focuses on algorithm design but does show that large problems can still be solved. Moreover, in all of them, transmission constraints are ignored. In Kamalinia et al. (2014) , which uses mean-variance optimization to study equilibria in a competitive market, a sensitivity analysis with respect to the transmission constraints shows that, as may be expected, these constraints have a major impact on generator's payos, and therefore on investment and the impact of risk aversion. The latter is not quantied, however. This study is also one of the few to explicitly consider investment in renewable generation capacity. 
Risk-averse transmission planning
Considerably less attention has been given to the eect of risk aversion on optimal transmission expansion plans. Sardinha et al. (2013) , using a CVaRbased transmission planning model with uncertain demand, show that higher levels of risk aversion can lead to an increase in the optimal amount of transmission in a simple 6-bus network. Delgado and Claro (2013) examine a similar setting but use multi-objective optimization techniques to analyze transmission investment in three dierently congured 3-bus networks. Their results indicate that the sensitivity of transmission investment to risk aversion depends on the network conguration. Neither of these studies consider possibilities for investment in new generation capacity, which seems to at least partially drive their results. Others have used minimization of maximum regret to analyze the eects of uncertain transmission outages on transmission expansion planning in small networks and large networks . In these studies, an increase in regret aversion increases investment in transmission capacity because this mitigates the costs of an outage, but again, generation investment is not possible. Applications on a 6-bus and 21-bus are discussed, but only in terms of total costs; neither transmission nor generation investments are presented, and no economic analysis is attempted. Similarly, Zheng and Pardalos (2010) analyze simultaneous investment in liqueed natural gas terminals and the gas transmission network in a setting where a planner minimizes costs subject to a CVaR constraint; they also do not present the optimal decisions, or any type of economic analysis of those decisions.
6
A range of studies consider robust transmission expansion planning methods. Since these minimize or constrain the cost of the worst possible outcome, they can be considered as modeling extreme cases of risk aversion. Most of these studies conclude that uncertainty and risk aversion increase investment in transmission capacity (for recent examples, see Jabr, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Ruiz and Conejo, 2015; Moreira et al., 2015) . However, these results are at least partly driven by the fact that generation investment is not usually endogenous in robust transmission planning models. If (risk averse) generation planners also respond to uncertainty, it is no longer obvious that an increase in transmission capacity is needed to hedge risks. A transmission planner may, for instance, even reduce transmission investment if generator risk aversion leads to a wider spatial spread of generation capacity.
Finally, we want to highlight the importance of transmission planning models that explicitly consider generation investments either in a vertically integrated setting or in deregulated markets (i.e., generators' response to transmission investments). It has been found that co-optimizing transmission and generation assets simultaneously can yield dierent transmission investment plans and cost savings of up to 10% of total system cost compared to generation-only planning in a vertically-integrated setting (Krishnan et al., 2015) . 2 More sophisticated, multi-level equilibrium models have also been proposed to take into account more realistic features of electricity markets. Sauma and Oren (2006) , for instance, shows that a proactive transmission planner that takes into account generators' best response to transmission investments can achieve higher social welfare than a reactive planner. In this model, Sauma and Oren (2006) assume that generators make investments and dispatch decisions sequentially, as in a closed-loop model, and that they have market power. This model was latter reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program (Pozo et al., 2013b,a) , thus enabling its application to larger and more realistic case studies, but ignoring market power.
The role of nancial markets
Most of the literature cited above implicitly or explicitly assumes that risk cannot be traded: investors do not have the option to insure themselves against future states of the world in which their prots are low or negative. In reality, investors can trade in nancial markets to hedge many of the risks they are exposed to. Some examples of nancial instruments that are used by investors to control their exposure to price risks include nancial transmission rights, electricity futures, forwards, swaps, and options (Deng and Oren, 2006 (2012) and Munoz et al. (2014) ) therefore operate under the assumption that electricity markets are perfectly competitive, which aligns the objectives of the transmission planner and investors in generation capacity, such that the problem can be collapsed to a single cost minimization.
This simplication does not in general follow through to risk-averse settings, but it can be extended to include some special cases of risk aversion, under some relatively straightforward assumptions.
First, we assume that generators maximize a convex combination of expected prots and the CVaR of the lower tail of these prots and that, as in the models above, generation investment and generation dispatch levels are continuous variables and have constant marginal costs, 3 to ensure that each generator solves 3 It is possible to use piecewise linear cost functions to approximate increasing marginal costs a linear prot maximization problem. Second, we assume that the electricity market is perfectly competitive such that each generator is a price taker. 4 In addition, we now also implicitly assume that a complete nancial market exists (i.e., if all market participants can trade in nancial products that cover every possible future scenario), although we do not model its equilibrium explicitly.
As mentioned above, this is an obvious simplication since modeling of nancial markets is outside the scope of this work, but it would be even less appropriate to ignore their (benecial) eects altogether. It has been shown that, given these assumptions, the generation dispatch and generation expansion equilibrium is equivalent to the solution of a risk-adjusted cost minimization problem (Ralph and Smeers, 2010; Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2011b) 5 . This is intuitive complete nancial markets ensure that the worst-case scenario is the worst case for every market participant; perfect competition then restores the market equilibrium to its risk-averse social optimum.
Finally, we assume that the transmission planner acts as a Stackelberg leader who maximizes a convex combination of expected social welfare and the CVaR of the lower tail of the social welfare distribution and use the same weights and CVaR thresholds as the generators. Given that we already know that the generator's equilibrium is equivalent to the outcome of a risk-averse cost minimization, it is then straightforward to prove that solution to the whole bilevel transmission-generation problem can also be found through a risk-averse cost minimization. To see this, we can write the full bi-level problem as
where f (x) is the (risk-averse) cost of transmission expansion, g (y) the (riskaverse) cost of generation and G (x, y) a set of constraints on generation that link the two. The reduced problem is simply max
x,y
Assume we have found a solution {x * , y * }to the reduced problem. Then, by Bellman's Principle of Optimality (Bellman, 1952) , given x * , y * must satisfy Eq. 3, and hence, the two problems are equivalent. Hence, as in the risk-neutral case, we can collapse the bi-level equilibrium problem to a (linear) optimization problem, as long as the assumptions outlined above are met.
Model structure
To introduce the model we rst describe the nomenclature. With the exception of the parameters α, Φ, and ω, we use capitalized letters for all sets and parameters. x i investment in generation capacity [MW] z l investment in transmission capacity [MW] y ihs generation dispatch level [MW] We formulate the investment-planning problem as a two-stage stochastic program. The rst-stage decision variables correspond to generation and transmission investment levels, denoted x i and z l , respectively. The expression CC corresponds to sum of the annualized investment costs, which we dene as follows:
Sets and indices
In the second stage there are economic dispatch decisions for dispatch period in each scenario s of economic, market, and regulatory conditions. We denote OC s the operating cost of the system for a representative year in the future.
Note that the expression OC s also accounts for the opportunity costs of curtailed demand through the Value of Lost Load (V OLL) and noncompliance with state and federal renewable targets through noncompliance nes (N C), which are assumed to be equal for all federal and state RPS systems. Given these expressions, we dene the objective function of the optimization problem as follows:
For ω = 0, the problem minimizes the sum of capital cost plus the expect value of operating costs across all scenarios s ∈ S. For ω = 1, the objective of the planning problem becomes the minimization of the Conditional Value at Risk, denoted with the auxiliary variable cvar. Note that since the annualized investment costs CC only depend on rst-stage variableswhich are not dependent on the second-stage scenariosthis term is not weighed by the parameter ω and it is outside of the cvar expression.
The co-optimization of transmission and generation investments is done subject to a series of constraints that we describe as follows:
CVaR constraints: We use the linearized formulation of the Conditional Value at Risk proposed by Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) as follows:
Market clearing constraints: The dierence between generation and demand equals a net injection at every bus in the system. Munoz et al. (2014) . Recall that these are soft constraints, since we allow for noncompliance with federal and state renewable targets. We also allow for the possibility of trading of Renewable Energy Certicates between states through the combination of constraints (15) and (16), as specied below. Constraint (15) imposes the minimum fraction of the renewable target that has to be met using in-state resources. Constraint (16) 
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Transmission build limits: We constrain the amount of capacity that can be added to a transmission corridor in the system. Note that the variable z l is expressed in MW and the parameter Z l is expressed as a fraction of a reference transmission line with capacity T l . 
Nonnegativity:
x i , z l , y ihs , c bhs , r bhs , f u s , su ps , a s ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G, ∀l ∈ L, ∀h ∈ H, ∀p ∈ P, ∀s ∈ S For transmission upgrades we consider two types of investment alternatives.
For existing transmission corridors we allow for the addition of the equivalent of up to two new 500 kV circuits and do not consider the possibility of creating new transmission corridors between existing buses. We also allow for the interconnection of renewable hubs to existing buses through radial transmission lines with up to four 500 kV circuits. As implied in the model description in the previous section, we assume that both transmission and generation investments can be made in small increments. We select the value of the price ceiling of Renewable Energy Certificates (λ) to enforce the renewable target constraint by performing a sensitivity analysis on a linear relaxation of the mixed-integer planning problem. To ensure that the variability of timedependent resources is at least partially represented, we use 50 representative scenarios obtained using the clustering methodology described in Sect. 4. We enforce a 33% renewable target across all regions that belong to the WECC, which is analogous to one of the regulatory scenarios analyzed in Munoz et al. (2014) . As shown in Table 1 , not enforcing a renewable target (λ = 0) would only result in a 7.5 % of demand being supplied from renewables. Such investments occur for purely economic reasons and do not require additional revenue streams from the production of RECs to be cost-effective. Raising the price ceiling λ naturally yields a monotonic increase in the penetration of renewables. We find that a price ceiling of $70 per MWh results in a 33.7 % penetration of renewables (Table 1) , which meets the target. All of the remaining numerical experiments are run assuming λ = 70 ($/MWh). The true 123 Figure 1 : Illustration of the WECC 240-bus system .
Stochastic transmission and generation planning
Installed and available generation capacity for new investments are listed in Tables A.6 and A.7, respectively, in the Appendix. We assume that demand can be curtailed at a price of 1000 $/MWh, which is the price ceiling for most markets in the US. For renewables, including solar, wind, and hydro, we model variability using hourly capacity factors from historical data from the year 2004.
As in Perez et al. (2016) , we use 10 representative hours of historical data. A detailed description of the dataset is provided in Munoz (2014) , Appendix B.
Timing
In the real world, transmission and generation expansion decisions are made on a rolling basis. The full problem would therefore be a multi-stage or rolling horizon stochastic optimization problem. Due to their size, these problems are dicult to solve even for risk-neutral models with small numbers of scenarios and therefore beyond the scope of this paper. However, we also cannot simply ignore opportunities for recourse: we would signicantly overestimate the eects of risk aversion if decision makers were stuck with the eects of their decisions, without any opportunities for further investment, for a long period of time.
We therefore approximate the multi-stage problem by only considering a single decision year, 2034, and annualizing investment costs. This implies that decision makers only incur the costs of their decisions for one year. Of course, we may now understate the results of risk aversion but, since in the real world investment decisions are often taken annually, our results will be more representative of a real-world planning situation those obtained from a model with a much longer planning horizon and no recourse options. 15
Costs
We assume that the capital cost of all generation technologies for the decade that leads to 2034, which is when investors will commit to the construction of generation capacity for 2034, will be the same as the ones projected by the US Energy Information Administration today (EIA, 2013) . Table 1 shows overnight capital cost, xed O&M, and net present costs (NPC) for all generation technologies available for investment in the model. The NPC corresponds to the present capital cost of generation, considering both overnight and xed O&M costs for the lifetime of each technology, using a discount rate δ of 5% per year. Since the planning model optimizes investments for one representative year in the future, we then compute the annualized capital cost CX, which is then used directly in the optimization model. 9 For transmission we use the cost estimates detailed in Munoz (2014) . To compute the annualized investment costs of transmission CZ l , we assume that transmission assets have a lifetime of 50 years and assume the same discount rate δ=5% is used for generation investment alternatives. 10 We enforce both federal (constraint (14)) and state (constraint (15)) Renewable Portfolio Standards only in the US portion of the WECC, excluding areas of Canada and Mexico. Table 2 shows renewable targets for all states in the WECC with binding mandates. These are the same projections of RPS targets utilized in Munoz et al. (2014) . 11 9 We compute the annualized generation investment cost using the formula CX =
, where LT is the generator lifetime in years.
10 The capital cost of all transmission investment alternatives are listed in Munoz (2014) . 11 Note that the projections of renewable mandates used in Munoz et al. (2014) are only approximations of the actual regulations in place. The state of Colorado, for instance, imposes dierent renewable targets for investor-owned utilities (30%) and municipalities (10%). For all states with RPS mandates such as the one in Colorado we use the maximum enforced target, 
Scenarios and risk aversion
Most stochastic transmission and generation planning models use a limited number of scenarios (usually less than 10) for computational reasons. To investigate the eect of risk aversion using CVaRs, this is not enough: as in the real world, we need to consider low-probability/high-consequence scenarios that can have a signicant eect on expected prots or welfare if they occur. Moreover, the smallest meaningful CVaR threshold level α in a model with s scenarios is 1/s, while typical threshold values are closer to 5%. We therefore dene 24 scenarios, which cover a range of possible policy, demand, and cost changes from now until 2034. The scenarios are based on four policy and demand scenarios WECC has recently constructed for use in its long-term planning studies (WECC, 2013) . The WECC scenarios describe sets of policies consistent with, respectively, a focus on economic recovery, a focus on clean energy, a focus on short-term consumer costs, and a focus on long-term societal costs, and thus span a broad range of possible futures. Key parameters of these scenarios are summarized in Table 3 .
In addition to policy and demand parameters, generation investment is heavily inuenced by relative prices of coal and gas, which the WECC scenarios do not fully capture. We therefore dene a separate set of three fuel prices scenarios, which are summarized in Table 4 and are broadly in line with predictions made by the International Energy Agency and the US Department of Energy.
A third important determinant of generation investment is the availability of nuclear capacity, which, as history has shown, can change rapidly in response to nuclear accidents; a third set of two scenarios, which are summarized in Table 5 , captures these possibilities. The 50% retirement of nuclear capacity corresponds assuming that climate change concerns will actually drive renewable targets towards more stringent levels than the ones considered today. Perez et al. (2016) proposes a deterministic planning model with more realistic features than the ones we consider in this article, including roughly to the amount of nuclear generation capacity in WECC constructed before 1990, and is also similar to the amount of nuclear capacity retired by Germany in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster; it is therefore our best estimate of the magnitude of a government response to a nuclear accident.
To construct our nal set of 24 scenarios, we simply take the Cartesian product of the four WECC policy/demand scenarios, the three fuel price scenarios, and the two nuclear scenarios, in the absence of any evidence to support correlations between the probabilities of scenarios in each set. For simplicity we assume that each of the 24 scenarios is equiprobable, although of course other assumptions could be made. Throughout the analysis, we use a CVaR threshold of α = 0.916, such that the CVaR selects the two highest-cost scenarios, and vary the weight on the CVaR, ω, from 0 (risk neutrality) to 1 (extreme risk aversion). Figure 2 shows the system costs for individually transmission-optimized scenarios, i.e., the system costs if one scenario is known to occur with probability 1. The bars marked "N" are the scenarios in which nuclear capacity is reduced.
As this gure shows, there is signicant variation in system costs between the
Status quo Nuclear accident
Nuclear capacity Current levels Current levels -50% scenarios; as may be expected, scenarios with higher RPSs, lower coal rather than lower gas prices, and less nuclear capacity are more costly. That does not necessarily imply that these scenarios are the most risky in a stochastic planning framework (although they are likely to be), but it does show that some scenarios are inherently more costly even if they are anticipated.
Results

Investment, costs and risk Figures 3 and 4 show how investment in transmission (backbones and inter-
connections to renewable hubs) and generation change with ω, the weight on the CVaR of the tail of the cost distribution in the objective function. A higher ω implies a higher weight on the more costly scenaruis, and hence, a higher level of risk aversion; when ω = 0, investors are risk-neutral. As these gures show, the impact of risk aversion on these aggregate transmission and generation investment levels in the WECC is minor. Investment in generation increases slightly with risk aversion, as does investment in interconnection capacity to renewable hubs. Investment in transmission backbones decreases slightly with risk aversion, more so than the increase in interconnection investment, such that the total investment in transmission decreases.
We will discuss the reasons for these changes in more detail when we look at the spatial distributions of investment, but before we do so, it is worth exploring why risk aversion seems to have such a limited eect on overall levels of gener- few scenarios, suggesting that the objective function is relatively at around its optimum. There are relatively cheap actions that can be taken to reduce exposure to risk (e.g., investment in renewable capacity, which in some locations is already close to competitive in a risk-neutral model); naturally, these increase costs in low-cost scenarios, but the trade-o is not severe. Secondly, once these actions are taken, there is little that can be done to further reduce risk. Even if investors only consider the worst scenarios, costs in those scenarios cannot be reduced further. In Fig. 5 , these worst scenarios are scenarios with high RPS levels, high demand growth, and high fuel prices. Even if investors had certainty that one of these would occur, there is no`get out of jail free'-card costs can be reduced somewhat, but these futures are still expensive, as Fig. 2 already indicated. These two reasons also explain why, as Fig. 5 shows, the level of risk aversion seems to matter little once we move to a case with ω > 0.
The existing literature suggests a third reason for the relative insensitivity of total investment levels to risk aversion. In risk-neutral stochastic planning models, it has been shown that the number of scenarios is of relative umimportance, while the range of scenarios is an important driver of model outcomes . This suggests that the most extreme scenarios drive much As mentioned above, the highest-cost scenarios are those with high state and federal RPSs and high fuel prices. It is therefore not surprising that the best hedge against those scenarios involves investing in renewables, which helps to meet RPS targets and, once constructed, their variable costs do not depend on fuel prices. This eect is not universal. In markets where there are current high levels of support for renewables through feed-in taris or other mechanisms which directly eect the marginal prots of generators, and high probabilities that these support mechanisms are stopped, renewables may well be riskier, and investment would decrease with risk aversion. In our setting, with our scenarios, however, they help reduce policy and fuel cost risk. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that US investors are increasingly looking at renewables for these purposes (Haemig, 2015) .
In general, it is notable that the dierences in investment levels for CTs and wind between risk-neutral and risk-averse models is much higher than the dierence in total investment levels so even if risk aversion has a minimal eect on total investment, there are still signicant dierences in the generation mix.
A similar, even more striking eect can be observed in the spatial patterns of investment. Figure 7 shows how the spatial distribution of generation invest- This implies that these interactions need to be modeled carefully before policy is designed, and that they cannot be considered in isolation. Figure 8 shows how the spatial distribution of transmission investment changes as a result of an increasing weight ω on costs in the worst scenarios, relative to expected costs. As we have already seen above, the total amount of trans- The eects of risk aversion on transmission investment are therefore very 24 dierent from state to state. As with generation investment, they are also highly non-monotonic again, making prediction dicult.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the eects of risk aversion on electricity generation and transmission planning in a large network. Hitherto, most studies focused on either transmission or generation planning; as we have shown above, there are important interactions between the eects of risk aversion on both of these, so a combined approach is clearly needed. Most existing studies also focus on small toy networks, which cannot be used to fully capture the spatial dierences in investment between risk-neutral and risk-averse models; again, as we have shown, these are important. We have shown how a risk-averse Stackelberg transmission-generation expansion equilibrium is equivalent to a risk-averse cost minimization under some reasonable assumptions, and applied this model to a 240-bus representation of the WECC network.
Our results show that, at least for our parametrization, risk aversion has only a small impact on overall levels of transmission and generation investment, because minor adjustments to investment patterns already reduce risk signicantly, thus limiting further hedging possibilities. In addition, extreme scenarios already drive much of the results of a risk-neutral model. However, although overall investment levels do not change much, there are signicant regional impacts, because of a shift from carbon-intensive to carbon-neutral generation and a changed transmission investment pattern that anticipates this. This highlights the importance of considering risk aversion in planning models, especially if these are used for policy making. Importantly, the eect of risk aversion on investment in particular technologies or in particular places is often nonmonotonic because of the complex interactions between renewable policies and between generation and transmission investment. This implies that they will be hard to predict, and are sensitive to particular assumptions about investors' attitudes to risk and particular renewable targets and other constraints. Naturally, our model is still simplied. Because we assume a perfectly competitive generation market and a complete nancial market, our model misses some of the strategic interaction between investors that occur in the real world.
Moreover, we only consider a one-stage game with annualized investment costs, which implies that investors only live with the results of bad decisions for one
year, which could well be an underestimate of the real regret. We also assume that all generators and the transmission planner have the same attitude to risk.
Further research into the application of multi-level equilibrium models to riskaverse energy investment applications is necessary to investigate the impact of these simplications. Nevertheless, our results are consistent with theory and anecdotal evidence, and we expect the same eects that we nd to carry over to models with more detailed market representations or ne-grained time dimensions.
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